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On 28 July the Japanese oil tanker M Star was damaged, and one crew member injured, in what was initially described as an “onboard explosion” whilst travelling through the Strait of Hormuz less than ten miles from the UAE and Oman. The vessel was carrying 2.3 million barrels of crude and bound for China, but has since docked at the UAE’s Fujairah port to assess the damage. Various theories have been put forward, including that the tanker was attacked. Piracy is rare in the Strait, however, while neither al-Qaeda nor other terrorist groups have shown an ability to operate there. The US Fifth Fleet, stationed in Bahrain, said that the tanker had not requested assistance, which also undermines this theory.

A second explanation posited that the tanker had collided with a semi-submerged object, such as a submarine or shipping container. Photos depict a uniform square-shaped dent, however, and there are no signs that it dragged against another moving object. The tanker could have struck a jetty at port, but this is likely to have been noticed prior to its departure. The damage fits closely to the inner structure of the vessel. The collapse of one or more of the ship’s storage tanks would produce a sound resembling an explosion, is not unprecedented, and would have produced this type of damage. Thus, whilst details remain sparse, mechanical or human error cannot be ruled out.

The cautious approach of the UAE, Oman and US to the incident probably aims to avoid any premature accusations against Iran, which has threatened in the past to shut down the Strait of Hormuz were it attacked by Israel or US. Despite the introduction of new UN, US and EU sanctions on Iran, an attack on a tanker bound for China – an important economic partner for Iran – would be contrary to Tehran’s interests. The media attention devoted to the incident shows the sensitivities surrounding the strategically important Strait, as well as the efforts of key regional players to manage potential sources of tensions.

The ruling coalition United People’s Freedom Alliance (UPFA) and the opposition United National Party (UNP) have agreed in principle to create an executive Prime Minister position. The PM would be accountable to Parliament. The agreement came amid special talks between opposition leader and former President Ranil Wickremasinghe and the UPFA leadership.

The move will curtail President Mahinda Rajapaksa’s powers, but it is probably a ploy for him to retain executive power; he had previously attempted to gain the right to amend the Constitution and end the two-term limit on the Presidency. Most likely he will attempt to become the next Prime Minister, thus retaining his hold on executive power. Indeed, it was his party, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, which proposed the new post. The UNP says it approves these moves because they reverse the transfer in 1978 of executive power to the President, away from the Cabinet and Parliament led by the PM. But it opposes vesting executive power solely in a PM who is not held accountable to the Parliament, and these details are yet to be addressed.

There is concern that the Government is becoming increasingly autocratic – the ruling coalition won a landslide in the 2010 Parliamentary elections, and may be unwilling to give up power. It is sprinkled with Rajapaksas. The President’s son Namal became an MP at the last election and nepotism remains in evidence: Rajapaksa’s brother Gotabhaya is Defence Secretary, and yet another sibling is Parliamentary Speaker. The coalition is well organised, evidenced by the quick appointment of the new Cabinet in April. In some respects this could bode well for stability as the country seeks to boost economic development.

Prime Minister Netanyahu met President Obama in Washington on 7 July. Both sides were keen to emphasise the positive atmosphere, in sharp contrast to Netanyahu’s last visit in March when a spat over settlement construction in East Jerusalem caused a significant deterioration in US-Israeli relations. Although the warm noises may boost Obama’s political prospects ahead of the US mid-term elections in November, little appears to have been achieved in regard to the peace talks. Subsequent discussions between Obama and Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas failed to produce a clear indication as to how the peace process might be taken forward while Israel continues to demolish Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem.

Abbas faced serious domestic criticism over the failure of past negotiations, and so has demanded progress in the proximity talks before any face-to-face meeting with Netanyahu. However, these preparatory discussions appear to be deadlocked over Tel Aviv’s reluctance to give further ground on settlements (see below) and its refusal to discuss the borders and security arrangements of a future Palestinian State. Indeed Amr Moussa, the Secretary-General of the Arab League, has already described the proximity talks as ‘failing’.

Egypt’s Foreign Minister warned that the League would appeal to the UN Security Council to declare a Palestinian State if the talks fail to achieve progress by September. This was clearly intended to draw parallels with Kosovo – which has achieved de-facto statehood despite an unsuccessful attempt to win Security Council recognition. Washington is almost certain to reject any Palestinian declaration of statehood but, because it quickly endorsed Kosovo’s secession, the initiative could further damage US standing in the Middle East. Should the move win considerable international support, it will also create further international difficulties for Tel Aviv (given the presence of Israeli troops on Palestinian territory).

The Palestinians believe, probably rightly, that Netanyahu is playing for time. The Cabinet remains the principal obstacle to any package of confidence-building measures which might convince Abbas to enter direct talks. Defence Minister Ehud Barak and Deputy Prime Minister Dan Meridor broadly support a set of concessions while Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman remains implacably opposed (as do many others in the conservative-dominated ruling coalition). These divisions provide a useful excuse for Netanyahu and the Prime Minister appears resolute in his determination not to bring the more moderate Kadima Party into the coalition.

It remains unclear whether Netanyahu will extend the ten-month moratorium on settlement construction in the occupied territories beyond its 26 September deadline. Comments made in Washington suggest that he will not and reflect the vocal domestic opposition to a renewed freeze. This remains a key issue for the Palestinians, particularly as construction has hardly slowed during the last eight months because so many new buildings were authorised prior to the moratorium. An extension to the freeze would likely see the first genuine slow down in building work for years, hence the increasing agitation (reported last time) among the settlers and their supporters.

Tensions over the alleged activities of Hizballah in Lebanon continued to rise during this period. The Israeli Defence Forces (IDF) released imagery which they claim shows newly-constructed Hizballah military installations near to civilian buildings such as schools and hospitals. The IDF had earlier shown the intelligence to the UN Security Council in June - an attempt to mark the fourth anniversary of the Lebanon conflict by highlighting the failure to enforce the Security Council Resolution that brought an end to the fighting (which prohibits the presence of paramilitary forces south of the Litani River).

While these claims may be justified - Hizballah remains active in UNIFIL’s area of operations (see today’s Lebanon Report) - previous allegations emanating from Tel Aviv have lacked credibility. We continue to consider Israeli accusations that Hizballah obtained Scud missiles in May to be unreliable, as were reports in this period that the movement received a large quantity of Iranian rockets via Syria and northern Iraq.

The UN Secretary General blamed the Scud reports for increasing the potential for conflict in the region and Israel’s latest allegations have further increased tensions across the northern border. Both Israel and Hizballah retain clear motivations to avoid renewed hostilities but, should political conditions change, a minor incident could spark significant escalation – the 2006 war was triggered by a relatively small Hizballah raid. There are many hawkish political and military figures in Israel who would welcome an opportunity to restore the IDF’s reputation and the scheduled end of both the proximity talks and the settlement freeze in late September could yet prove a turning point.

Several uncorroborated reports this period described the growing threat from Bangladesh’s Islamic militants. For example, it was claimed that three factions of the banned group Harkat ul-Jihad ul-Islami (HuJI) had reunited and planned to execute attacks, whilst another stated that members of another outlawed organisation, Jamaat ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), were training in the Sundarbans forest in the South. However, none of these warnings appear linked to current arrests of extremists or attack-planning. Nor are they likely to be related to the charging of 60 JMB members for an arms heist in 2003, or the indictment of an alleged HuJI leader for an assassination attempt on current Prime Minister and Awami League (AL) leader, Sheikh Hasina, in 2000.

Separately, it was reported that a number of Bangladesh Islamic militant groups had formed a conglomerate in cooperation with al-Qaeda and Pakistani militants to carry out attacks in Bangladesh. While several members of the al-Qaeda-linked Pakistani militant group, Lashkar-e-Tayba (LeT), were arrested in Dhaka in November 2009 for planning attacks on the US and Indian diplomatic sites, there is no compelling evidence of a high-level relationship between Bangladeshi militant groups and either LeT or al-Qaeda. The security forces also probably restrain their ability to operate internally and abroad. The threat warning of HuJI attacks against US and Bangladeshi diplomatic missions in India’s West Bengal mentioned in today’s India report does not therefore appear to be credible.

The claims of a resurgent threat may allow the Government to justify its increasingly secular position, as demonstrated by crackdowns on both banned Islamic militants and opposition Islamist groups (see below). Its policies may have the unintended consequence of increasing internal radicalisation, which could reverse the security services’ largely successful efforts to combat extremism since the JMB’s last wave of attacks in 2005-6.

On 30 June Benigno “Noynoy” Aquino was sworn in as President. He swiftly announced his Cabinet, which contains both experienced Ministers and relative newcomers. His appointments suggest a commitment to introducing the economic reform the country desperately needs. The Philippines lags behind its regional peers economically and its growing budget deficit requires swift attention. However, Aquino’s Liberal Party lacks a majority in either chamber of Congress and despite defections from Lakas-Kampi CMD - the party of his predecessor Gloria Arroyo – he will face challenges in passing controversial legislation. This is despite his huge personal popularity, demonstrated by his large election victory and the turnout of 500,000 supporters during his inauguration.

Aquino immediately kept a pre-election promise by creating a “Truth Commission” to investigate the myriad claims of large-scale corruption against his predecessor. Arroyo was elected to the House of Representatives and retains some power and influence, which she will use to resist any probe. Indeed, she immediately filed a resolution for an unspecified Constitutional amendment: this is probably an attempt to test her support and an indication that she will attempt to disrupt Aquino’s tenure to gain leverage over any accusations made against her. Indeed, speculation continues that she will use her position to try and introduce a Parliamentary style of Government, where a Prime Minister from the lower chamber could become the country’s key political figure.

Moreover, Vice President-elect Jejomar Binay rejected four different Cabinet positions offered to him after he was not offered the Interior portfolio – which would give him control over the police - or the Local Government portfolio, both of which he had publicly coveted. Binay is from a rival party and hugely ambitious; control of these Ministries could be used to deliver votes in the next Presidential elections. Even without a portfolio as Vice President he is a potential source of instability for the Administration as he can use his high profile to promote his own agenda, possibly at odds with that of the President.

Meanwhile, a left-wing protest against the Visiting Forces Agreement with the US outside Washington’s Embassy in Manila took police by surprise, but was quickly contained with only minor clashes. The controversy over the presence of US troops is exacerbated by claims they have been directly involved in the killing of militants. Aquino will likely resist pressure to re-negotiate the treaty as US support significantly aids operations against Islamist rebels. However, this demonstrates the intense sensitivities around anti-militant operations, which may deplete the political capital he requires to pass unpopular reforms.

Late on the night of 19 June an explosion in a shop in the Bekaa Valley town of Zahle killed one and injured two others. The two wounded men and the shop’s owner were subsequently arrested on suspicion of preparing an explosive device, possibly a car bomb. These allegations were lent credibility by reports that Ziad Hussein, the man killed, was a jihadist from the nearby mainly Sunni town of Majdal Anjar. Hussein’s brother is believed to have died in a shootout with the security forces a few months ago – although this has not been confirmed.

Zahle is home to the largest Greek Orthodox population in the Middle East and the blast came just before the Maronite Patriarch’s first visit to the area for over sixty years. If the explosion was linked to a plot to target the Patriarch it is possible that his convoy would have been attacked in the majority Shia area of al-Karak. There are currently tensions between the Patriarch and Hizballah following his seemingly stern condemnation of the group during a recent visit to France. An attack launched from a Shia area would have exacerbated Lebanon’s religious tensions, a key objective of jihadist groups operating in the country.

Meanwhile a Kuwaiti paper reported the theft of rockets from a storage facility in the South, the implication being that they belonged to Hizballah. If the report is true then the most likely culprits would be al-Qaeda-linked groups such as the Abdullah Azzam Brigades, which have been responsible for a number of indirect fire attacks from Lebanon since 2005. The last such operation was in January 2009 and the infrequency of attacks may indicate that weapon systems have been hard to come by (though the jihadists are principally constrained by their ability to move weapons into the limited Sunni areas of the South). If the report is accurate then a small-scale, short-range rocket attack on Israel can be expected to follow in the next few weeks.

Al-Qaeda released an audio message from the late al-Qaeda number three, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, on 16 June, which discussed the 13 February Pune German bakery bombing (see our Report of that date). The content suggests they intended to air the tape ahead of Ramadan (which will begin in August) as this is a time when pious Muslims make or increase charitable donations and so may be more inclined to donate money to al-Qaeda. Al-Yazid’s death in May probably spurred them to release it earlier. Al-Yazid inaccurately claimed that the attack targeted Jews, most likely in order to increase fund-raising support, given hostility to Israel amongst his target audience.

Of much greater significance is Al-Yazid’s claim that the attack was perpetrated by an al-Qaeda unit based in Kashmir led by well-known jihadist Ilyas Kashmiri. The Indian intelligence agencies’ belief that a domestic jihadist group, the Indian Mujahideen (IM), is responsible does not undermine the plausibility of this claim. There are many - if sometimes loose - links between al-Qaeda, Kashmiri militants and Indian jihadists. Kashmiri may have masterminded the attack but used Indian jihadists to carry it out.

Al-Yazid was al-Qaeda’s general commander and so had responsibility for appointing leaders. His statement can therefore be seen as confirmation that al-Qaeda’s leadership is allowing Kashmiri to use the name al-Qaeda in Kashmir (AQK). Significantly, official affiliation with al-Qaeda is only granted to groups with effective operational capability. Kashmiri released a statement shortly after the Pune bombing which did not explicitly claim responsibility. However, al-Qaeda would not risk another group refuting their claim of responsibility and so Kashmiri’s involvement is highly plausible. Kashmiri’s statement threatened attacks on major sporting events and several cities including the Commonwealth Games. These are likely to remain primary targets. Kashmiri’s capabilities will be enhanced by al-Qaeda’s relationship with Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and his cadres are likely to have received training in Pakistan’s tribal areas.

The creation of AQK can perhaps be seen as an intensification of the al-Qaeda and Taliban strategy of trying to divert Pakistani Army attention towards India by carrying out a major terrorist attack (see today’s Pakistan Report). This was begun with LeT’s November 2008 Mumbai raids. While relations with Pakistan are slowly being rebuilt following that attack, both sides played down expectations of major progress during preparations for the forthcoming Foreign Ministers’ meeting in July, and the relationship remains vulnerable to any terrorist attack in India that can be linked to Pakistan.

In an unprecedented move the National Assembly rejected the Government’s planned high-speed rail link between Hanoi and Ho Chi Minh City. The USD 56 billion project has been the subject of much controversy since it was first mooted. Critics have argued that the expense cannot be justified on the grounds that there are more pressing concerns, including agriculture, education, power and a budget deficit of 8.4%. Furthermore they have said that it does not meet the accepted formula for economy of scale that shows that rail transport is only more cost effective than air up to 800 km. The proposed bullet train route is more than double this.

The defeat is a major embarrassment to the Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) and is the first time that they have been challenged by the National Assembly. They operate on a tacit principle of “performance legitimacy”, whereby they retain power on the basis that they govern for the good of the country, which has been hitherto unquestioned. It is probable that the Ministers who put forward the bill, Deputy Prime Minister Nguyen Hung and Transport Minister Ho Nghia Dung, will bear the political cost of the defeat in order to save face for the CPV.

The Government is likely to step up its repression of opposition figures to ensure that the incident does not lead to increasing popular dissent and criticism of the Executive by Parliament. However opponents of the Government will have been given encouragement by the action, and the National Assembly may increasingly hold the Government to account over policy. This has the potential to weaken the CPV’s grip on the country and boost the bid for democracy, but it is likely to be a slow process, if at all, and is therefore unlikely to impact on domestic security.

Colonel Gadhafi has authorised a payment of USD 2.9 billion to victims of IRA bombs made with semtex, a plastic explosive allegedly supplied by Libya to the Irish republican group in the 1980s. Gadhafi has not explicitly admitted to supplying such materials to the IRA, instead portraying the payments as a “goodwill” gesture. It could be followed by further direct Libyan investment in Northern Ireland, with a USD 1.4 billion payment for development projects currently under discussion.

Semtex was used in at least 10 high-profile IRA bombings, including attacks on the Harrod’s department store in London in 1983, the Ulster town of Enniskillen in 1987 and Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie in 1988. More recently, it was used in a bombing by the splinter group the Real IRA in 1998. The payments are meant to appease residual public anger over Libya’s alleged role in these attacks and thereby cement diplomatic and business relations with the UK.

Former Prime Ministers Gordon Brown and Tony Blair came under heavy criticism from families of the victims of the Lockerbie bombing for their increasingly cordial relations with Gadhafi. Nonetheless, these payments suggest that the Cameron Government is equally determined to pursue relations with Libya, which has huge reserves of oil and gas. This is likely to benefit British companies operating and investing in Libya, where political relations have consistently had a direct impact on business decisions.

The Taliban attacked two Ahmadi mosques in Lahore on 28 May, killing more than 90 people and wounding a similar number. The attacks took place close to the city centre in the Model Town and Garhi Shahu areas. In Model Town militants launched a brief assault with automatic weapons and grenades, while in Garhi Shahu the jihadists occupied the mosque for a number of hours before three suicide bombers detonated their devices.

The Ahmadi are a sect regarded as unislamic by both Sunni and Shia because they consider their founder, Ghulam Ahmad, to be a prophet – thereby denigrating Mohammed in the eyes of other Muslims. Indeed, in Pakistan the Ahmadi are legally barred from referring to themselves as Muslim. While isolated incidents of violence and discrimination against the Ahmadi are commonplace, an attack on this scale is unprecedented.

The attractiveness of the Ahmadi as a target for jihadists has increased in recent years as members of the sect have risen to more senior positions in the Army. Both Model Town and Garhi Shahu are relatively prosperous areas of Lahore and the militants may have expected serving Ahmadi to be among the worshippers (it has not yet been confirmed whether military personnel were killed or injured in the attacks). The Taliban has targeted Army officers at prayer in the past – in December last year a Major General, a Brigadier and two Lieutenant Colonels were killed when four suicide bombers attacked the Parade Lane Mosque in Rawalpindi.

The authorities claim that the militants were trained in North Waziristan and comprised both jihadists from the Punjab and Taliban from the Tribal Areas. We consider this claim to be credible and it reflects the formal ties established last year between the Taliban and groups with a presence in Punjab, such as Jaish-e Muhammad and Lashkar-e Jhangvi. The growing unpopularity of the drone campaign, the attack on the CIA facility in Khost and the Times Square plot have since strengthened this alliance by directing anti-US sentiment towards support for the Taliban.

Interior Minister Rehman Malik responded to the attack by calling for an ‘operation’ to clear the Punjab of militant groups. His comments were widely interpreted as a call for a military incursion and prompted a wave of objections from the Provincial Government and religious leaders. While Malik was forced to rule out an Army offensive he suggested that targeted operations might be considered. The risk of attacks in Punjab has risen significantly in the last three months (since Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif tearfully asked the Taliban to cease attacks in his Province) and military interventions could further exacerbate the threat. On 1 June militants killed more than ten people in a raid on one of Lahore’s hospitals which may have been intended to free a jihadist captured during the attack on the mosques – an indication of the audacity with which militants are already operating in Punjab.

Agus Martowardojo, an experienced banker, has been named Finance Minister. That neither he, nor his newly appointed deputy, have strong links to any of President Yudhoyono’s rivals demonstrates his current political strength. Agus plans to continue the globally admired economic reforms of his predecessor, Sri Mulyani Indrawati - under whom his deputy worked at the Finance Ministry - who resigned last month. However, Agus’s relative political inexperience may limit his efforts to force through reform against entrenched opposition, though his deputy’s experience may help to offset this slightly. Whether Agus can successfully continue his predecessor’s fight against tax evasion will provide a useful initial indicator of whether he will be effective.

Meanwhile, the Chairman of the powerful Golkar Party - in part responsible for the resignation of Sri Mulyani – is already attempting to exploit his power as head of the newly-formed joint secretariat of coalition partners. This position was probably part of a deal to forget the Bank Century bailout scandal, in which Sri Mulyani was implicated. His proposal that each member of the House of Representatives be allocated the equivalent of USD 1.6m to spend in their District has been seen as a brazen attempt to circumvent the power of the Executive over expenditure, whilst creating huge opportunities for corrupt political patronage at taxpayers’ expense. Although unlikely to be implemented it is nonetheless indicative of the ambition of him and his party.

In addition, the Jakarta High Court has reopened an investigation into two Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) employees. This is despite the President halting the case in December after it emerged the evidence had been fabricated by others already under KPK investigation. These developments have sparked fears of a return to the cronyism of the Suharto dictatorship, which ended twelve years ago, exacerbated by the appointment of Yudhoyono’s son to the position of Secretary-General of the ruling Democratic Party.

While Indonesia’s economy is booming and the political system is generally stable it is notable that the House of Representatives has passed no legislation since its session started in October. The Bank Century bailout hearings and other monitoring activity provide an opportunity for political grandstanding which plays well with voters but has distracted from action to address much needed economic and political development.

On 8 May employees of a private security company (PSC) opened fire, killing a local man, after they were targeted by a roadside bomb in Wardak Province, southwest of Kabul. Hundreds of angry civilians reacted by blocking the main Kabul-Kandahar highway, stranding hundreds of vehicles. The following day, the Government banned two PSCs (both involved in earlier fatal shootings) from using the route. A spokesman added that “the perpetrators have been arrested and are being prosecuted”.

This follows the imprisonment on bribery charges of a Briton employed by the company guarding the British embassy in Kabul, noted last time. Once again, there is almost certainly a political element to these actions, with the Government hoping to secure leverage over London. These events are also a reminder of the growing assertiveness of Afghan officialdom and the tone of President Karzai’s visit to Washington (see above) suggests that this change will be permanent.

In the meantime, the Government also revoked the licenses of 152 local and 20 international non-governmental organisations (NGOs) for unspecified ‘misconduct’. Karzai has frequently accused NGOs of involvement in corruption in an attempt to divert claims that his own administration is either complicit or has failed to address the problem effectively. While it may appear on the surface that this is an attempt to tackle the issue, it is almost certainly misdirection, intended to sway local opinion ahead of the Kabul jirga.

Israel has come under increased pressure to sign the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) bringing renewed international scrutiny of its nuclear capability. A number of Arab countries have been increasingly vocal in recent weeks in their call for a nuclear free Middle East, a call ostensibly endorsed by all five permanent members of the UN Security Council. However the Arab states have criticised the US for its seemingly inconsistent policy in the region; censuring Iran for its nuclear ambitions whilst silently supporting Israel’s continued possession of nuclear weapons.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) will now discuss Israel’s nuclear capabilities at a meeting on 7 June. The IAEA Board has not discussed the issue since 1991, and the Agency’s Director General, Yukiya Amano, has asked the 151 member states to share views on how to persuade Israel to sign the NPT. This has sparked some concern in Tel Aviv that American support for Israel’s policy of nuclear ambiguity is wavering. President Obama has reportedly reassured Prime Minister Netanyahu that he remains committed to the ambiguity policy and Obama would face significant political opposition at home if he were perceived to be undermining Israeli security. Nonetheless, the US acceptance that the IAEA should discuss the issue may be intended to serve as a warning to Netanyahu that he must demonstrate commitment to the peace process if he is to retain Washington’s support.

Separately, Israel has been admitted to the Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development in spite of Palestinian lobbying to prevent the move. The Israeli Finance Minister hailed the move as being of significant economic and political importance and membership will allow Israel to develop ties with the most powerful players in the global economy. The standards set for entry will force improvements in public administration, corporate management and anti-money-laundering legislation. This should make Israel a more attractive business environment and encourage investment. It comes at a welcome time for the Government when international pressure on Tel Aviv is mounting.

Arrests of members and supporters of Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS), effectively the student wing of the main Islamist militant organisation Jammat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), continued in this period. Again, Rajshahi University in the north-west saw the most incidents. Whilst weapons and home-made incendiary devices were found during raids, there has been less resistance to these latest sweeps, and the large-scale roundups seem to have helped limit violence linked to ICS. Instead, there have been growing clashes between factions of the student body sponsored by the ruling Awami League, meaning that the Universities remain a hub for potential unrest.

The fighting amongst student bodies reflects the unsettled wider political situation. The opposition Bangladesh National Party (BNP) has staged several more walk-outs from Parliament. It has also threatened to renew the boycott it ended in early February if the Awami League (AL) - dominated Government does not stop bringing cases against the party’s leaders and openly insulting its founder. At one point these tensions even boiled over into a five-minute physical skirmish between MPs.

In this period AL leader Sheikh Hasina was acquitted of several more corruption charges. Some remain outstanding but these too are likely to be quashed. In a similar vein, hundreds more outstanding “politically motivated” cases brought against AL figures under former regimes were dropped upon review. Although good for political stability, the fact that only a tiny percentage of cases against the BNP have been dropped has caused resentment. This contributed to the opposition Chief Whip demanding an investigation into Hasina’s son’s “illegal” VOIP business. Shortly afterwards he reported receiving death threats, which in turn led to BNP protest rallies. Although quite credible, this may be part of efforts to portray the political situation as being in disarray. Either way the issue will probably continue to run.

Arrests of members and supporters of Islami Chhatra Shibir (ICS), effectively the student wing of the main Islamist militant organisation Jammat-ul Mujahideen Bangladesh (JMB), continued in this period. Again, Rajshahi University in the north-west saw the most incidents. Whilst weapons and home-made incendiary devices were found during raids, there has been less resistance to these latest sweeps, and the large-scale roundups seem to have helped limit violence linked to ICS. Instead, there have been growing clashes between factions of the student body sponsored by the ruling Awami League, meaning that the Universities remain a hub for potential unrest.

The fighting amongst student bodies reflects the unsettled wider political situation. The opposition Bangladesh National Party (BNP) has staged several more walk-outs from Parliament. It has also threatened to renew the boycott it ended in early February if the Awami League (AL) - dominated Government does not stop bringing cases against the party’s leaders and openly insulting its founder. At one point these tensions even boiled over into a five-minute physical skirmish between MPs.

In this period AL leader Sheikh Hasina was acquitted of several more corruption charges. Some remain outstanding but these too are likely to be quashed. In a similar vein, hundreds more outstanding “politically motivated” cases brought against AL figures under former regimes were dropped upon review. Although good for political stability, the fact that only a tiny percentage of cases against the BNP have been dropped has caused resentment. This contributed to the opposition Chief Whip demanding an investigation into Hasina’s son’s “illegal” VOIP business. Shortly afterwards he reported receiving death threats, which in turn led to BNP protest rallies. Although quite credible, this may be part of efforts to portray the political situation as being in disarray. Either way the issue will probably continue to run.